ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MOROCCO: CIVIL SOCIETY'S CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITS

Larbi Jaidi. Professor at Université Mohamed V Rabat, Morocco

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 2000s, Morocco has experienced a change in its economic and social development dynamic. Growth has never been so strong over such a long period; a growth that is not free of paradoxes, weaknesses and imbalances but nevertheless has brought about a transformation of the production system structures and social changes. In this dynamic, Morocco is enduring serious difficulties in linking prosperity and social cohesion. An important cause of these difficulties is the delay accumulated for years in the management of social needs, mainly in the rural world. The other cause is the difficulty of the development model to meet the imperatives of the social inclusion of women and youths in the labour market and addressing social inequalities. The needs for social commitment have intensified under the effect of several factors: volatile growth, opening of the economy, geographical mobility, poorly controlled urbanization, relaxation of social links, rise of individualism, and emergence of new expectations.

Since the mid-1970s Morocco has been engaged in a 'controlled' democratization process supported by institutional reforms favoured by the national mobilization on the Sahara issue. This process has gradually led, with ups and downs, to the expansion of civil liberties. With the 1997 'consensual alternation', the democratization process has enabled relations between the power and the opposition to be redefined and has opened opportunities for alternation in the management of public affairs, while bringing about new forms of conflict. The role played by opposition political parties and civil society actors in this process has not been negligible, both at the level of political advocacy for democratic change and of political and social demands.

The expansion of liberties has opened the way to the development of the associative environment and to a proliferation of initiatives by the social movement, a movement that was not born in the wake of the waves of protests and uprisings experienced by the Arab world since 2011. This does not mean that Morocco has not been involved in any political protest following what was all too soon called the 'Arab Spring'. However, in contrast to what happened in the rest of the region, it was possible to regulate the political tensions without violence. At the root of this particularity is the specific configuration of the Moroccan political system, the achievement of political reforms that started some years ago, and the progress in terms of the rule of law. Today, social movements increasingly have new political demands. The rise of mass mobilizations reveals the decline of the legitimacy of traditional political parties and illustrates the emergence of an increasingly segmented society that has clear effects on politics. The challenge of this situation lies in the capacity of the new constitutional reform to meet the demand for a redefinition of the relations between the state and society. The (political) 'rationalities' that had strongly marked the institutional universe of previous decades are losing their essence and efficacy in the management of political tensions.

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A CHANGING MOROCCO

Some years ago Morocco started a process of important and often arduous reforms and established the objective of developing its economy and institutions in order to ensure a convergence towards an economic system governed by market laws, with an open and democratic government system. Taking into account the issue of the democratization of the institutions in the formulation and management of economic policies reveals the awareness that the success of the economic reforms is closely linked to the parallel existence of the structures. Today, a key issue dominates the debate on the management of public affairs in Morocco: the need to realise the hopes awakened by the constitutional reform for better governance of public decision-making and a more transparent and efficient functioning of the institutions. The mistrust expressed in recent years by the social movement of the government, parliament and political class is hindering the potential for economic development and the progress towards a more socially committed society.

Economic Growth: Performances and Weaknesses

After the 1990s, a decade during which the Moroccan economy followed a cyclical pattern that alternatively combined expansion and recession, it experienced a phase of consolidated growth up to 4.7% in real terms between 2001 and 2013 against an average of 2.8% between 1991 and 2000. The new phase involved access to a higher growth rate despite an unfavourable environment characterized by an increase in the price of energy products, a slowdown of world growth from 2008, and two years of recession in 2005 and 2007.

Record Growth

The economic growth recorded since the early 2000s was higher than that of the population, which grew 1.7% per year on average. Consequently, GDP per capita increased by 3% on average over the whole period. However, these performances materialized without fanning inflationist tensions or destabilizing the macroeconomic foundations. Growth was sustained by a strong domestic demand, stimulated by the support for the purchasing power of households and the acceleration of investments in infrastructures and the social field.

From 2009 to 2012, the Moroccan economy suffered a series of micro-shocks: first, financial with the international crisis and, later, political with the effect of the 'Arab Spring'. Each in their way disrupted the course of growth and domestic and foreign accounts. The transmission mechanisms of the world crisis followed the circuits of the exports of goods and services, tourism revenues, remittances by Moroccans living abroad and foreign direct investments. The financial system, given that it had not yet achieved a sufficiently significant level of integration into the international markets, was relatively unscathed. The effects of the Arab Spring were disseminated through the channel of unexpected public spending submitting the budget to strong oscillations mortgaging healthy management of its accounts.

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Despite the negative effect of these mini-shocks, Morocco's economic performances over the last 12 years have been solid. On average between 2000 and 2013, Morocco's growth was systematically higher than that of its Maghreb neighbours: an increase of 4.7% in GDP compared to 3.3% for Algeria and 4% for Tunisia. However, the Moroccan growth model showed several signs of breathlessness, notably the worsening of macroeconomic imbalances it generated and the difficulty of reducing the high unemployment.

External Weaknesses

Thus, the trade deficit continued to grow during the period 2000-2013. This deficit was mainly fuelled by the imports of intermediate goods and raw materials (notably oil and cereals). It also has its origin in the negative trade balance within the framework of the free trade agreements. The trade deficit resulting from these agreements amounts to almost half of the global trade deficit.

Globally, the contribution of the foreign balance to growth has been weak. Under the effect of an annual average growth of imports that is higher than exports, the Moroccan economy's rate of dependence on the rest of the world (global trade/GDP) revealed a bullish trend with a gap of over 20 points between 2000 and 2013. The dependence of the production system on imported inputs raises the question of the productive, cross-cutting and sectoral diversification that can favour the integration of the productive fabric. The weak competiveness of Moroccan products in exports also contributes to this dependence, as do the strong geographical concentration of exports on a not very dynamic European market and Morocco's specialization in business sectors with weak added value.

The succession of shocks finally destabilized growth and balances built up over time. Resilience faded and structural weaknesses reappeared. The factors of resistance became sources of concern: growth slowed down, the margin of budgetary manoeuvre reduced, the trade deficit widened and the current account deteriorated. Moreover, the structural deficiencies of the Moroccan economy, partly concealed by the euphoria of the 2000s, continued to be its poor competitiveness, the failure of convergence and the dysfunctions of the economic sectoral plans, the slowness of diversification of the production system, and the delays in the implementation of major reforms. These deficiencies fed the tensions in the labour market and the injustices of social inequalities.

The year 2015 poses open questions. At a macroeconomic level: how to reconstitute the margin for budgetary manoeuvre, how to remobilize the growth potential in a psychologically worrying political environment? At a microeconomic level: what will happen with the investment of private enterprises when they are under the constraint of the self-funding rates and declining margins, managing overstaffing and more difficult market conditions? At a financial level: how will the funding conditions evolve when saving is slowing down, the cost of funding is quite inflexible and companies are reticent about exposing themselves to the financial markets? Based on this background of macro and microeconomic weakness, citizens seek to defend their available income and purchasing power.

Social Fractures

Although the economic growth was noticeably higher in the 2000s than in the 1990s, it was not enough to meet the needs of employment. However, the strengthening of growth had positive effects on people's standards of living. An improvement in the population's standard of living must be noted, given the continuous increase in the disposable income per capita and the decrease in the poverty rate. This situation was complemented by relative stability in the inequality index. The human development indicators for Morocco show significant progress but it continues to be poorly rated. The homogenization of society around the middle class is hindered by the reproduction of social inequalities.

A Weak Growth Generating Employment

The relationship between growth and employment in the period 2001-2012 highlights an elasticity of employment in relation to weak growth, which would not enable the flow of young men and women entering the labour market to be absorbed.[1] Alongside the rigidities of the labour market and the lack of qualifications of some graduates, this is a major obstacle to reducing youth unemployment. The lack of employ-

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1. The Haut-Commissariat au Plan considers that the employment elasticity of growth would amount to between 0.3 and 0.5.

ment in the economic growth is due to different factors: the growth of the working age population, the entrance of women into the labour market, and the public education policy of public powers, which did not keep their promises, resulting in a major gap in the labour market between the supply and the employers' needs for qualified workforce.

Thus, the unemployment rate, although in decline, was still significant and amounted to 9.1% of the active population. The decrease in the unemployment rate concealed certain critical dysfunctions of the labour market. Less than half of the population (48.5% of people aged 15-64) participated in the labour market (one of the lowest rates in the MENA region). Unemployment more particularly affected people living in an urban environment (14%), young people (19.1%) and graduates (17%). According to the World Bank (2013), the unemployment rate among youths aged 15-24 would reach approximately 50% in Morocco.[2] However, and despite the implementation of a certain number of initiatives to promote employment, the labour market in Morocco is characterized by persistent imbalances that pose certain challenges to be overcome.

Poverty in Decline

In a framework of controlled inflation, purchasing power has improved annually. This favourable progress has been reflected at the level of poverty indicators. Thus, the poverty rate dropped from 21% to 6.2% between 1985 and 2011. However, the vulnerability rate is still high despite its reduction between 2001 and 2007 (from 22.8% to 17.5%). Poverty has therefore experienced a fall but mainly continues to depend on climatic conditions. There is a large concentration of vulnerable population around the poverty threshold. The state plays a prevailing role in the social assistance mechanisms but, as a whole, in Morocco they are far from adequate because they do not reach a large number of poor and vulnerable people. They have not been conceived with a view to a clear reduction and prevention of poverty strategy; moreover, they are fragmented and dispersed in different public authorities.

Persisting Inequalities

Despite the marked reduction of poverty, Morocco has experienced persistent, if not greater, income inequalities. The income of 10% of the well-off is over 12.7 times that of 10% of the poorest. The quintile of the richest population already accounts for 48% of the total income against 6.5% for the poorest quintile. The Gini coefficient, calculated to provide a better account of the issue of inequality, almost shows stability in this measure between 1998 and 2007 and of its level, which is always high in Morocco. The income inequalities have a negative impact on growth (negative partial elasticity around 0.003).

This concentration of incomes reflects the narrow social basis of the middle class in Morocco. If we refer to the results of the study on the middle classes conducted by the Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP),[3] the middle classes encompass 16.3 million people, i.e. 53% of the Moroccan population. Nevertheless, within this population statistically called 'middle class', 72% has an income below the national average income and 28% constitutes the upper category with an income above the national average. The proportion of households with debts among the middle classes reaches 30.6% against 37.5% of well-off households and 27.3% of modest households.

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2. Thus, given the low rates of participation in the labour market, the official unemployment figures underestimate the number of unemployed people. Moreover, the informal sector amounts to 37% in non-agricultural jobs while the employment considered vulnerable (unpaid family jobs and self-employed) amounts to 50% of total employment. Their proportion of total employment is much higher in Morocco than in the other MENA region countries because of the high proportion of self-employed (including workers contributing to the family business) associated with a relatively low percentage of people with a paid job.

3. This study is based on the National Household Survey on Living Standards 2006/2007. According to this approach, middle classes are made up by populations whose consumer spending or level of income are in the central bracket of the social distribution of these indicators. The option chosen is extensive (0.75 times the median for the lower bound and 2.5 times or over for the upper bound).

Inequalities in Morocco do not only appear in the measure represented by the distribution of income. They are also found in all social indicators (education, healthcare, access to public services…). Morocco's Human Development Index rose to 0.591 in 2013, ranking 130th out of 187 countries graded. Thus at a human development level Morocco is ranked significantly below what may be predicted by its economic development level.

Political Disenchantment

During his reign, King Hassan II had managed, after 40 years in power, to establish the monarchic institution in a dominant position by exercising its control over producing and managing the rules of the political game. The principle of the separation of powers defined by the successive constitutions, however, meant that the functioning of the monarchy fell on the two fields of the religious and the rational, and thereby confirmed the 'transcendental' nature of monarchy. The political conflicts and power relations deriving from them finally imposed this institutional set-up over the remaining political actors, notably the components of the national liberation movement, which shared with the sovereign the commitment to the fight for independence and consequently nationalist legitimacy.

Since the start of the democratization process in 1973, the opposition has decided to participate in the opening of power, to extend it as much as possible and profit from it to better organize itself by accepting, in return, the tacit conditions of this opening (legitimacy of the monarchy, the sacred nature of the king).[4] This opening had a dual effect: institutionaliza-

tion of the electoral process and preparation of the conditions for the entrance of the left-wing in the management of public affairs. It was in 1998 when Morocco first experienced 'consensual alternation' with the arrival in government of a coalition led by A. Youssoufi, a major figure in the Moroccan left-wing.[5] This political experience marked the evolution of contemporary political Morocco. Undoubtedly, the political system began to more positively meet the demands of the elite with a view to more participation.[6] The political conditions seemed more favourable than ever to the establishment of closer relations between the monarchy and the left-wing to accelerate the pace of these reforms. This political opening released a potential for emancipation and learning for the stakeholders of the political process. The government discovered what the political field means in terms of management of public affairs.[7] Similarly, the monarchy had to accept a new model of power sharing.

The democratic potential, until then contained, not to say repressed, was gradually expressed in different forms and with varying degrees of coherence and continuity. On the one hand, the democratic progress in the field of civil liberties, transparent elections and freedom of the press were real. On the other, relations between the monarchy and the left-wing remained marked by reciprocal control and tensions from past history. What we witnessed corresponded more to a first phase of political liberalization in which democracy was still a project under construction. But this does not prevent that this evolution process, in contact with the reality of the political and socio-cultural tensions what affect the society, advanced or rather

4. The Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires and the Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme decided to participate in the political opening of power by accepting the constitution in force and participating in the local and national elections.

5. This political experience has been qualified as 'consensual alternation' because the leader party of the new political alliance did not have the majority of the votes given that the constitution of the new government was the result of a negotiation between the Palace and the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires.

6. Outside the brief and significant experience of the A. Ibrahim government after independence, Morocco has never experienced the participation of the left-wing in power.

7. The El Youssoufi government was made up by an alliance of parties, some of which had already participated in earlier governments but the vicissitudes of political life in Morocco for 40 years have meant that the leader party of the government coalition Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires has been in opposition since the early 1960s.

bearer of the seeds of a certain form of modernity, which is specific to Morocco.

The Monarchic Succession

After the accession to the throne of King Mohammed VI, the constitutional problem did not form part of the royal agenda. Faced with the tentative demand for constitutional reform by left-wing parties, the king asserted his will to reign and govern and insisted on the need to reform the political parties. Bearing in mind the architecture of the system, which could not be modified, the monarch opted for a gradualist approach emphasizing institutional reforms.

Thus, the king first expressed his will to consolidate the rule of law through the implementation of a process of modernization of the institutions.[8] Later, in his speeches he regularly expressed the determination of the state to give real meaning to the democratic practice by ensuring the legitimacy of the elections.[9] Hence the royal insistence on the renewal of political management structures − parties, trade unions, associations and the media −, based on respect for internal democracy, the right to difference, and competition.

In fact, the achievement of the democratization of the institutions not only involves a revision of the texts but is the result of a political practice. An examination of the functioning of the political system over the first ten years of the new reign (1999-2011) shows that the potential for democratic emancipation has not truly been achieved. The political opening is tolerated insofar as it was top-down and controlled. This type of opening has rather contributed to state control of society through the institutional weakening of the political parties, trade unions and so on. Thus, the government and the elected bodies seem to form part of an 'institutional machinery', without having a real influence on most political deci-

sions. Beyond the appearance of a government that decides and manages with its ministerial departments and administration, there is another centre of power, constituted around the king's advisors and other spheres of influence. This centre exercises a parallel yet real power that has the final word. The centrality of the king, at the core of this universe, is supposed to dominate and control the decision-making process. This practice that perpetuates the rules governing the functioning of a 'Court Society' not only limits itself to weakening the relations of the government with the royal power but reproduces the functioning of a system built upon clientelism, neo-patrimonialism, and the use of politics for financial gain. A system that imbues the individual behaviour of policy-makers, beyond the loyalty required in the exercise of their responsibilities, to mark them with the imprint of servitude.

Social Mistrust

The experience of alternation has shown the ambivalent behaviour of the political elite who, using modern discourses and instruments, pursue traditional objectives. Personal relations, family links, tribal affiliations, groups and clients are still the most determinant levels of political positions. The capacity for and pace of absorption by the Moroccan political elites of the democratic culture are still too weak to dare imagine anything other than a political system with a monarchy as the central actor. These elites have interiorized, sometimes unconsciously, the principles of authority in the widest sense and the culture inherent to them so well that they have clearly stated the need for some time to discover the virtues of autonomy. In other words, the debate on the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy is not really on the agenda. It is perhaps an ideal type towards which will be necessary to move within a few years.

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8. This approach was expressed in the initiatives aimed at rationalizing the institutions provided for in the constitution: revision of the royal decree ruling the National Human Rights Council; restructuring of the Higher Council and the Regional Ulama Councils in order to better qualify them to assume their mission; implementation of the Economic and Social Council in order to establish the culture of dialogue on the democratic mechanisms; the reform of the Supreme Court; and the reform of the Civil Liberties Law.

9. The reforms of the Electoral Law, the Communal Charter and the Civil Liberties Laws formed part of this perspective.

The experience of consensual alternation has also shown a key dimension of the exercise of power in Morocco, i.e. the management of the tension between contradictory temporalities, and notably the gap between the long-term nature of the institutions, in contrast to the medium-term nature of the action and the short-term nature of opinion. In this framework, the change can only be gradual to enable the political elites, which are slow to change, to digest the stages. Paradoxically, at the same time as the transparency of the ballot boxes is progressing, confidence in the institutions of the emerging democracy is declining. The elections have damaged trust in voting, parliament, political parties, and politicians (their honesty, their attention to citizens' problems). They have delivered a series of indicators on the institutions of representative democracy and the members thereof and have revealed a gap between citizens and their representatives.

The experience of consensual alternation has finally revealed a democratic malaise through the low participation in elections.[10] Abstention also reveals the low importance attached to the act of voting: voting is no longer seen as one of the foundations of political life. The high level of abstention illustrates a real 'civil fracture'. This reflects the social and cultural distance between some citizens and the political universe. This strong abstention not only reflects the poor social and economic integration of these citizens but also has a more political aspect: it expresses a desire to protest by citizens well integrated into society and interested in public affairs. The main components of the political scene only control a tiny part of the electoral corpus. It is the core of the mechanism of the 'democratic transition' parties that is affected. Behind this behaviour, which underlies a great deal of mistrust, distancing and protest, we foresee the emergence of a new type of increasingly more critical citizen.

This behaviour of distancing should not be interpreted as a sign of political apathy but rather a call for a profound renewal of the working of the political system. These indications do not mean that most citizens approve of an authoritarian regime but rather reveal mistrust of the political representatives together with the level of dissatisfaction regarding the operation of Moroccan 'democracy'. Distant, partly corrupt, completely lacking in legitimacy, this is the image that the Moroccan political class has today. The equivalent of this poor image of the men and women holding power or leading the parties is the loss of trust by a large majority of citizens in the parliamentary institution as such. Hence the vulnerability of the representative democracy institutions.

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This erosion of trust and the rise of a 'growing cynicism' towards the elected representatives and rulers do not only involve a deterioration of classical democratic participation (electoral participation, party militancy, civil commitment) but also favours the development of 'protest politics' ('radical' movements, protest activism), which until now has contributed more to eroding the relation with an emerging democracy than to offering credible alternatives. Thus, a hiatus is established between a democratic ideal and a reality marked more by 'cynicism' and disenchantment. This relative divorce has contributed to destabilizing the fragile democratic achievements, which only have sceptical support from part of the electorate.

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10. The arrival, in 2002, of a government of technocrats led by Driss Jettou broke with what in Morocco was called the consensual alternation process. King Mohammed VI preferred to appoint as his successor A. El Youssoufi, a qualified technocrat and insider instead of a politician from the majority party.

The Challenges of the New Constitutional Reform

As a response to the political impact of the 'Arab Spring', the king made the decision to propose a constitutional reform. The distinctive feature of this reform comes from the fact that the monarchy has anticipated the crystallization of the protest movements in the wake of the 'Arab Spring' by proposing a reform. The king entrusted a committee with the preparation of the constitution project. Another committee made up by political party and trade union leaders was established to compensate the lack of political legitimacy of the first committee.

By giving an overwhelming majority to the 'yes' vote (98.7%), the referendum endorsed the centrality of the monarchy in the national political system.[11] However, the constitutional revision anticipates the architecture of new relations between political institutions (monarchy, government, parliament): the consolidation of the separation of powers (appointment of the prime minister within the party winning the elections, strengthening of the power of the prime minister as head of the government); the consolidation of the rule of law; the will to make justice an independent power; the strengthening of citizen management bodies (the role of parties, the parliamentary opposition and civil society); the consecration of the plurality of the Moroccan identity and the constitutional recognition of the Amazigh component; the consolidation of mechanisms of moralisation of public life with a view to linking the exercise of authority with the imperatives of control and accountability; and the constitutionalization of the bodies responsible for good governance, human rights and protection of liberties. The new text includes the demands of civil society actors such as Amazigh activists (recognition of the Amazigh language as official language: art. 5), women's organizations (parity: art. 19) or Moroccans living abroad (recognition of full citizenship rights: art. 17),

trade unions (the maintenance of the House of Councillors: art. 63), and elites of youths (creation of the advisory board). The new constitutional text offers a non-negligible potential to the development of participatory actions. Citizen action has autonomous tools and means whose use can powerfully make up the contours of a democracy underway. It is necessary to conceive the institutional rooting. If the participatory approach must, as the new constitution suggests, irradiate the legal and institutional framework rather than continue to be at most a procedure that is not an exception to common law, it is still necessary to organize the modalities of this evolution in the revision of legal texts.

CIVIL SOCIETY'S COMMITMENT TO THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES

Moroccan society's changes in the last two decades have shaken the positions and capacities of traditional civil society actors (trade unions and professional organizations) to work in the field of political and social demands. They have had impacts on the strategies of these actors, i.e. the very representativeness of the organizations. The social partners (trade unions and the employers' association) are faced with the need to speed up their progress. The associative movement plays a more dynamic role in the current democratic evolution; however, it is still faced with several limits and difficulties to be overcome in order to firmly establish its vision and action with a view to real democratic development.

Trade Unions and the Employers' Association: Two Social Partners Losing Speed

Moroccan trade unions and the employers' association are restricted by several burdens but are always hopeful of modernizing their structures. They are both confronted with two challenges: on the one hand, the crisis of representativeness and, on the other, the

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11. Some minority movements have stated their rejection of the constitution granted: the 20th February Movement, the Unified Socialist Party, and Annahj (The Way: extreme-left wing), political groups such as Al Adl wal Lihssane (Justice and Charity: Islamist) and associations such as the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH).

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A Trade Unionism Ruined by the Archaism of its Discourse

Four trade unions (out of the 17 existing) dominate the national unionist landscape.[12] The data related to the number of members is approximate and difficult to verify: between 200,000 and 1 million, i.e., a membership rate (members/trade union population) ranging between 6.7% and 33%. The sectors covered by the trade unionist action are the formal private sector (1.2 million employees in 7,500 enterprises affiliated to the CNSS or National Security), 120,000 employees in public enterprises and 840,000 working in the public service.

Between 2000 and 2015 the unionist action experienced difficulties linked to persistent unemployment, notably in the urban environment. Indeed, the instability of the employer/employee relationship is at the root of a reduced commitment by employees to labour conflicts. Nevertheless, it has reoriented the action of trade unions and refocused their demands on the preservation of jobs. Social conflicts are driven by classic concerns: work instability, social rights, pay levels and so on. Indeed, the crisis of Moroccan trade unionism shows characteristics specific to the configuration of the labour world and wage-earners: important flows of entries and exits

and a permanent renewal of the bases, protected sectors and exposed sectors; a difficulty to address the new salaried classes; a mode of authoritarian operation; a delay in taking into account the changes of society, and so on. The unequal management of the members adds to the spontaneity of the action. Moroccan trade unionism is also experiencing difficulties with the negative effects of its division, over-politicization, and lack of professionalism and institutionalization. The history of national trade unionism is strongly marked by the presence of ideological quarrels, the conflictive nature of its relationship with the political field and the aura of its charismatic leaders. In contrast to Europe, where the sociological changes led to the advent of a society in which the differences between workers are more acute, in Morocco we are still at an initial model of trade unions embodying labour groups with almost homogenous concerns. The production system is still built on small structures, rudimentary forms of organization, and professional relations in which paternalism prevails.

Given the lack of adaptation to the new situation of the international environment and the opening of the national economy, trade unions would find themselves in an awkward position faced with the challenges of competition, or even the expectations of the salaried population. The transformations shaping the economy and society are not sufficiently taken into account by trade unions. From this observation it can be deduced that trade union behaviour, its language and modes of action, are the core of the problem. It is not the essence of the institution that is being questioned but rather its forms, styles, behaviour and modes of action. If the renewal takes time, the historical functions of representation and regulation that define its raison d'être will be affected.

An Employers' Association in Search of Meaning

The Confédération générale des Entreprises du

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12. The Union marocaine du travail (UMT), the Union générale des travailleurs du Maroc (UGTM), the Confédération démocratique du travail (CDT) and the Fédération démocratique du Travail (FDT).

Maroc (CGEM), founded in 1947, is the main body representing employers; it is the major interlocutor with public powers and social partners.[13] It also aims to increase the value of the image of the business world and contribute to the establishment of the necessary conditions for strengthening free competition. Along with the challenge of upgrading the companies, the CGEM is faced with two major problems linked to the scope of its representativeness and the limits of its organizational efficiency, on the one hand, and to the historically conflictive nature of relations with trade unions, on the other. The association, with a will to reform, began a project in 1995: to reconcile economic performance and the social sphere in a framework marked by an overly weak mobilization of companies. The objective of this project was condensed into a single formula: to promote Corporate Social Responsibility. It announced its intention to build the foundations of a renewed contractual policy by placing business values at the core of society. Nothing happened although the employers' association has not in fact forgotten the issues that are very important to it: more flexibility, fewer burdens.

In its quest for credibility with the state and public opinion, the CGEM took the initiative (in 1998) to set up an Ethics Committee to make companies aware of the infringements of ethics. This initiative was a way of recognizing that corruption, special privileges and practices contrary to transparency are a powerful hindrance to the competitiveness of companies and free competition. Nevertheless, the main role in the field of the fight against non-ethical practices falls to sectoral federations and associations.

Moreover, with the aim of improving its brand image among trade unions, the Confédération prepared a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Charter.

Despite the solemn terms used, some provisions are no more than mere commitments to respect the law on issues such as hygiene, accidents at work and occupational diseases. The Corporate Social Responsibility Charter acts as a reference to achieve the CSR label granted by the CGEM.[14] The reality of CSR in Morocco mainly refers to the image that some companies would like to present of themselves to stakeholders. The argument of the CGEM mainly reveals a legitimate aspiration for integration into the world market by attempting to align with the OECD and European Union standards, resulting in a strong link between the CGEM version of CSR and the real or potential links of the companies based in Morocco with the demands of the market, including competitiveness in the international market.

The experience has shown that Morocco not only needs a change of the rules of the game but also and above all a revolution in behaviours. At present, the CGEM is committed to actions to restructure the association: revising the statutes, reviewing the services provided, enlarging the regional presence, strengthening competences and capital bases. But the challenge of renewal will lie above all in redefining the missions and producing a strategy to renew its representative power by redefining its identity image. A broader vision of social justice must replace a purely mechanical conception of salary demands: a modern and responsible trade unionism, in keeping with the expectations of social Morocco on the issues of flexible employment, conflict regulation, professional relations and social solidarity.

The Emergence of the Associative Movement

The two decades after the country's independence were marked by the rise in power of the state. An

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13. There are other groups such as the Union générale des entreprises et des professions and, more recently, the Mouvement des entreprises du Maroc. The CGEM is the main network of entrepreneurs in Morocco with 31 statutory professional associations bringing together the enterprises and professional associations of the same sector. It has approximately 40,000 direct and affiliated members and has at present 10 regional representations throughout Morocco.

14. The CSR label is a solemn recognition of respect by Moroccan companies of their commitment to observe, defend and promote the universal principles of social responsibility and sustainable development in their economic activities, social relations and, more generally, in their contribution to the creation of value.

administrative coverage of the whole of the territory enabled the political regime to firmly establish its power by exerting maximum control over the opposition forces. This policy engendered a kind of social inertia unfavourable to the emergence of a dynamic civil society. In the 1980s, under the effect of social struggles and the exacerbation of political tensions and the economic crisis, the public powers sought to defuse these tensions through a socio-political opening aimed at the opposition and non-governmental institutions. Thus, a movement of democratic demands was gradually developed, embodied by a dynamic and plural associative network (associations for the defence of human rights, women's rights, cultural rights, fight against corruption, and so on).[15]

A Plural Associative Movement

The associative movement has experienced a notable evolution since the mid-1990s in several fields: a diversification of the fields of action and an exceptional expansion of their role in the provision of social services, community development and advocacy actions: a significant contribution of the feminist movement to the democratic associative movement; the emergence of a new culture: that of the acceptance of difference and pluralism in collective work and the independence of the associations in relation to party affiliation.

These evolutions prompted the emergence of several advocacy associations at a national level (or that wish to be) sharing a common culture and developing the opportunities of consultation and coordination. Limited in the beginning to the big cities, coordination and networking extended to other regions of the country.

The scope and diversity of the associative movement provide fertile ground for the expression and develop-

The scope and diversity of the associative movement provide fertile ground for the expression and development of citizenship.

ment of citizenship. Although it is difficult to have reliable data on the number of people involved in these associations, the perception of their significance in political, economic and social life is becoming more noticeable. The issue of the role of the associative movement in democratic evolution is linked to a typology of the associations and the varied contributions to the dynamics of social, political and economic life. The notable movements include:[16]

• Advocacy in favour of democracy: components of the associative movement have played a role of mediation between state and individual. They are more particularly associations that defend human and women's rights, or that work on fighting against corruption, on increasing the responsibility of government towards the governed, and on the emergence of citizenship.

• Promotion of gender equality: the women's movement has managed to place the issue of the promotion of women's rights at the core of political debates.[17] The actors and actresses of the fight for women's rights have managed to make the demand for gender equality advance with the adoption of a new Family Code, the improvement of women's political participation and the amendments to the Labour and Penal Codes (2003).

• Defence of human rights: the associations of defence of human rights have contributed to fostering respect for and the culture of human rights

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15. The emergence of Islamism on the political scene and in the associative field has been one of the major issues in the two last decades. A flourishing young independent press also illustrates the dynamism of civil society.

16. Typology defined by M. S. Janjar, R. Naciri & Mohamed Mouaquit (2004). *Développement démocratique et action associative au Maroc : Eléments d'analyse et axes d'intervention*. Rabat: Droits et Démocratie/Espace Associatif.

17. The popular mobilizations 'for' and 'against' the Plan of Integration of Women in Development illustrated the conflictive nature of two systems of reference: the universal instruments, on the one hand, and the visions inspired by religion, on the other.

through several instruments: Forum Vérité et Equité, reform of the National Human Rights Council (CCDH); a new Equity and Reconciliation Commission, and so on.

- Promotion of cultural rights: the construction of the modern state and the transformation of Moroccan society (rural exodus, rapid urbanization, decomposition of tribal structures, and so on) have meant that the Amazigh language and culture have been marginalized. The awakening of identity was firstly academic with the multiplication of the studies on Amazigh cultural heritage and, later, the Amazigh associative movement contributed to the democratic development of society by calling for respect for cultural diversity.
- Support for citizen participation: The contribution of the associative movement to local development has been enormous by playing a role in the elimination of illiteracy, the development of microcredit and the activities generating income and the emergence of a new culture of citizenship.
- Lobbying for constitutional reform: In the wake of the Arab Spring, Morocco has seen the emergence of the 20th February movement in a political and social landscape marked by authoritarian blockage, the weakness of the political parties and the structures of representation. The movement has been able to make the problem of the constitution emerge as a pressing political issue; this emergence forms part of a more general discourse on condemning the king's authoritarianism and entourage.[18] The mobilization organized by this movement took place through such diverse group actions that the very idea of a unique movement poses a problem: cacophony of the discourse and practices, decentralized and multiform movement aimed at organizing itself in networks and

spreading everywhere through local committees and neighbourhood committees; a movement that is not limited to ideological representations and that above all makes pertinent use of technological communication.

Innovative Action Modes

The new social movements reflect the fundamental changes experienced by Morocco (women's movement, human, cultural, economic and social rights movements…). These civil movements present themselves as the heirs of the workers' movements with which they share the major core values: human rights, democratic principles, secularism, solidarity, social justice, and so on. However, they differ in their approach, which leads to a brand new vision of the ways of 'doing politics' and the ethical demands involved.[19]

The motivations of the protests are linked, although not exclusively, to the decline of purchasing power (water, electricity, transport, access to healthcare…).

> The new civil movements present themselves as the heirs of the workers' movements with which they share the major core values: human rights, democratic principles, secularism, solidarity, and social justice.

We find demonstrations against insecurity or in favour of local social development projects. These demonstrations, sit-ins and peaceful marches also take place in disadvantaged and forgotten areas. The safeguarding of the environment also finds its place in this plural movement: the fight against the pollution

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18. Demonstrators focused on explicitly political demands such as parliamentary monarchy, the democratic and popular constitution, the division of powers, the abrogation of article 19, the separation of power and wealth, the establishment of accountability, liberty, dignity, citizenship, the dissolution of the Parliament and the destitution of the government, the recognition of the Amazigh language as official language, the release of all political prisoners, and so on.

19. Nevertheless, this movement, issued and formed, for the first generations at least, within the political parties, has distanced itself from the parties but without imposing a social model in the ground practice.

of the phreatic layers or for cleaning the towns and neighbourhoods, combating damage to ecosystems by industrial and tourism projects. The denunciation of the forms of the rentist economy, such as sandpit or mining concessions, also forms part of this movement, as does the denunciation of the scandalous use of money for the purchase of candidates or electors in the last elections. The rebellion of populations in the Sahara and the difficult reconciliation with the marginalized Rif region are also at the root of the large mobilization movements.

These movements distance themselves from traditional political actions through specific forms of action: occupation of the street, petitions, complaints, recourse to justice, (plural) use of Internet, specific modalities of expression (protest songs), and so on. They are not organized following a traditional hierarchical form (party or trade union) but as an encasing of networks; they do not have a complete political programme but try to submit alternative proposals; they do not solve their unavoidable contradictions but do not limit themselves to old ideological divisions: they strive to found their actions on the achievement and exercise of rights in a concern for independence and autonomy in relation to the states and party structures.

From Mistrust to Rebirth?

In the national political landscape, we see a lot of mistrust, distancing and protest and we sense the emergence of a new type of far more critical citizen. However, we have the impression that while the values of democracy are evolving on the surface of society, confidence in the state and the institutions of representative democracy is decreasing. Meanwhile, this relative alignment with the democratic regime favours the development of a 'protest politics' (extremist movements, protest activism, urban unrest) and contributes to eroding the relation with common law and the meaning of general interest. This mistrust can contribute to destabilizing the democratic process, which would only benefit from sceptical support of the public but can also put democracy

back in motion by encouraging reflection on reforms aimed at invigorating representative democracy and developing participatory democracy.

Today's social movements act in frameworks that are experiencing very strong regulatory evolutions. Whether they form part of the 'classical' tradition of the centrality of labour conflicts or the issue of 'new social movements', the institutional or political frameworks to which they refer are based on the primacy of political regulations. The more or less direct 'face to face' that in the past characterized relations between state and social movements is no longer pertinent and real. From now on, the latter form part of frameworks – frameworks of regulations – in which numerous different actors increasingly intervene at different levels, each of them seeking, according to their own interests, to influence the existing rules, reform them or produce new ones.

In professional relations, the classical employers-trade unions-state triptych is much more complex. The emergence of consumers, local powers, environmental defence associations and so on has modified the situation. Its only effect is to make the modalities of arbitration in conflicts between employees and employers ever more difficult. It also has as a consequence a proliferation of initiatives and mobilizations, the most efficient of which are not necessarily the most visible, and which (each by itself) try to impose very disparate, sparse and specific formal or informal regulations of the rules of the game.

Hence a multiplication of the sources of conflict: legitimacy conflicts, authority conflicts, precedence conflicts and above all 'rule conflicts' that refer to 'polymorphic conflicts'. Evidently, the same phenomena are reproduced in the implementation of more societal demands, whether they concern the movement of youth, women, poor and vulnerable people or other social categories. Here also, the group mobilization takes place in the spaces with a strong intervention of many actors involved in specific symbolic representations and strategies also in relation to the rules of the game.

All things considered, what is now at stake for social movements is the efficacy of the collective action they unleash and which, faced with the proliferation of sources of power and rules, involves a fight for credibility; that is, the credibility of the rules that they are compelled to propose in the 'regulatory frameworks' in which they act. This established fact may seem anodyne to some, even trivial. However, it has as a consequence political implications which, in our view, are far from negligible. They consist of the capacity of political organizations and civil society organizations to invent modes of coordination of their actions, while respecting their respective autonomies and the specific role of each component in the consolidation of the rule of law and the intelligent and efficient coupling of representative democracy and participatory democracy. They also consist of defining a new relation of the state with society and, more particularly, the political and associative movements effecting social innovations while respecting their autonomy.

THE NEW RELATIONS OF THE STATE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

In Morocco, social conflict has become eruptive. The lower number of strikes has partly been compensated by the growth of protest groups. Here we find another feature of our social regulation system, in which dialogue in the labour sphere regularly runs the risk of being counterbalanced by the structural flaws of dialogue in other spheres of social life.

Indeed, collective mobilizations intervene in a framework of political disenchantment. These movements go beyond the trade union and/or party framework in the narrow sense when they do not purely and simply refute them. In today's society, the emergence of segmented, group or spontaneous mobilizations is a matter of trends concerning the presence of the 'political' in the city. They mainly concern the status of democracy today which, in the discourse of the numerous social events, cannot be limited to the single representative democracy or to the single interventions of the political power. The increase of citizens' participation in public decision-making has become even more necessary given that the public intervention has slowed down, showing the limits of the decision-making procedures based only on elective representation. Hence the need to take into account proximity to meet the demands of populations confronted with pressing needs.

It is in this framework that the state has been forced to introduce innovations in the regulation of social conflict stressing citizen participation initiatives or renewing the social dialogue mechanisms and institutionalizing dialogue with civil society.

INDH or the Attempt to Couple Representative Democracy with Participatory Democracy

The National Human Development Initiative (INDH) comprises a series of programmes launched by the public powers in 2005 with the objective of reducing poverty, vulnerability, insecurity and social exclusion and establishing dynamics in favour of human development. These programmes target 250 urban neighbourhoods and 360 rural municipalities through social projects generating income.[20] The second objective of this initiative is "to improve the living conditions of poor and vulnerable people" and enable the "promotion of wider access to basic services, social programmes and economic opportunities in the pockets of poverty."

The participation of populations, the contractualization and partnership with the associative network and local development actors are at the core of the INDH foundations to ensure better ownership and feasibility of projects. Since the launch of the INDH, over 22,900 projects have been undertaken to the benefit of 5.2 million people. Over 85.7% of the loans

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20. The targeting of rural municipalities and urban neighbourhoods has been possible thanks to the establishment of poverty charters developed by the Haut Commissariat au Plan in collaboration with the World Bank. These charters have made it possible to identify the rural municipalities (poverty rate over 30%) and the districts with the poorest urban neighbourhoods.

have been repaid. Moreover, 6,000 associations and partner cooperatives have been involved. The INDH has been subject to several assessments. Currently, these assessments do not allow the specific impact of the INDH on poverty, insecurity, exclusion and more generally human development to be measured. The changes brought about in the INDH programmes within the framework of phase 2 (2011-2015) have consisted of redressing the sectoral approach to form part of a dynamic of integrated local development, improving the participatory approach for better ownership and, finally, more accurately targeting the areas and populations and sustaining the projects.

Participation, a Social Catalyser

The programmes form part of a participatory community development approach. The members of the target communities themselves express their priority needs in terms of social facilities and services, support for activities generating income, and strengthening capacities and social invigoration. These needs are studied at the level of the municipality or the neighbourhood and are funded within the framework of a 'local human development initiative'. The implementation of this local initiative had to be done by seeking a convergence with the sectoral programmes of the central ministries and the development plan of the local authorities.

The participatory approach is seen as a real catalyser for sustainable development. It establishes new links between the stakeholders of a town or village (elected people, local representatives of the ministries, local authorities and other policy-makers) in decision-making. This participatory process was to make each of the stakeholders responsible and strengthen inclusion and social cohesion. It enables citizens to launch group and individual initiatives. Moreover, their commitment to the development process exerts a positive pressure on technical services and local authorities.

Although participation is a central issue of the INDH philosophy, its appreciation is very difficult due to the multiple aspects it embraces: information, training, consultation, taking into account views, revising results, participatory follow-up and assessment, mediation, inclusion, representativeness, and so on. Moreover, the quality of the participation depends strongly on the quality of human resources, the mode of governance, and the availability of and access to information.

The Involvement of the Associative Actors

The governance, started by the INDH, had to support the decentralization and deconcentration process and contribute to a better implementation of the principles of participatory and representative democracy. Some imperfections have been identified, such as the imbalances sometimes seen in the representation of elected members, state services and associations within the local committees and respect for the gender approach in the categories of women and youths, mainly at the level of the committees.

Among all these actors participating in the implementation of the INDH,[21] the associations and cooperatives have a central place. Yet, currently the associations do not always fully play their role of decision-making actors within the committees of which they form part, as they do not always know the missions and assignments. Moreover, their position in the INDH makes them a potential rival for the elected members in terms of influence on local policies. This situation has often led either to the creation of numerous associations by opportunism and political ends or to the weak involvement of the elected members and therefore a weak commitment of the local and regional authorities to the local governance of the INDH. There is also the fact that most of these associations lack the capacities necessary to manage the projects.

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21. Many actors participate in the implementation of the INDH: associations and cooperatives, local elected members, external services, local authorities, universities, the private sector, and technical and financial partners.

Many associations have seen their position in the system of social action and the organization modified by the new public policies. As active pieces in the mechanism, they have proven to be easily mobilizable, sometimes even exploited. The spirit of partnership has not yet gained a right of citizenship. Institutional legitimization is sometimes eroded: the Local Human Committees at a local scale (made up of elected members, associations and local authorities) tend to substitute the committees elected in the decision-making to the detriment of the rules of good local governance. The Moroccan social landscape, already naturally entangled, becomes even more opaque through the multiplication of procedures and greater dispersion of the actors.

The associations participating in the actions against exclusion must be better recognized, with respect for their autonomy, by the political-administrative authorities. In short, in many places, the INDH appears as an addition of new structures to the traditional apparatus (Committees of Elected Members) while ensuring a coherent evolution of the whole of the institutional and social landscape. Certainly, it is not possible to produce efficiency in such a short term. The Initiative, pertinent in itself, would gain efficacy by placing itself in a profound trend aimed at strengthening the decentralization and deconcentration. The initiative has brought about an institutional re-composition of the actors and makes it necessary to reflect on its organization and operation.

Social Dialogue in Search of a Renewal

The links between the social partners are experiencing greater tensions, both in the public and private sectors, putting an end to the relative stability that has prevailed during the past decade. We have seen a notable increase of strikes between 2010 and 2013 as well as of companies affected, strikers and lost working days. Bypassing the law, eluding control and alleging difficulties in conforming to the law, thereby maintaining impunity, provide the grounds for protest. Faced with these widespread practices, the means of prevention and repression available prove to be clearly insufficient.

The Difficulties of Collective Representation

Generally speaking, there is no collective representation in the companies with fewer than ten employees, although the Labour Law encourages the voluntary organization of professional elections within these companies. Likewise, in most small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which constitute the backbone of the national economy, collective representation is still merely formal. Consequently, in the absence of representative trade unions, the conditions of collective negotiation are lacking.[22] The regularity of the sessions of social dialogue has not been observed. The negotiations are hindered by the lack of a clear institutional framework for collective representation in the public sector and by the lethargy of collective negotiation in the private sector.

The system of representation, negotiation and resolution of collective conflicts established by the labour law with the aim of developing social dialogue between employers, employees and their organizations does not manage to establish dialogue or contribute to social peace. As shown by the modest number of collective agreements concluded to date, the relations between trade unions and employers are experiencing great difficulties to build the collective autonomy necessary for the development of collective negotiation, which is still the best means to arbitrate between collective demands and the capacities of enterprises.

The public sector in its turn has experienced repeated strikes in recent years. The demands of civil servants are categorically addressed due to the multiplication of particular statutes given the lack of a system of collective representation at the scale of central administrations and their external services. Lacking a legal framework for organizing these relations,

22. This is why collective negotiation remains linked to the strikes instead to being linked to collective agreements and social peace. The number of collective agreements concluded, a mere 18 and most of them in companies, reflects their weakness.

many channels of dialogue are used to prevent and deal with the conflicts both at the level of central and external services of the administrations and on the occasion of the bipartite or tripartite national dialogue. The social dialogue is still confused and lacking a device enabling it to be framed and limit the negative impact of the collective conflicts in its contribution to the development of sectoral policies and the establishment of social peace.

The Prospects of National Social Dialogue

In Morocco, the law gives social partners the responsibility of fostering social dialogue. It is both a key for better governance and a driving force of economic and social reforms. Its final objective is to contribute to addressing issues related to unemployment and employment and to support the economic reform and social cohesion by defining subjects for collective negotiations. This emphasizes the challenges to which the social partners are confronted given their role and responsibilities in the definition of a social model.

In a recent announcement, the CESE (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) considers that dealing with collective conflicts requires that the participation of the social partners is ensured for the enrichment of public policies by making collective negotiation a regular procedure of balance between the social demands and competitiveness of the companies. This is how conventional law becomes a synonym for social peace, and the contracting parties guarantee respect for it by monitoring the bilateral mechanism for resolving collective conflicts.

The establishment of new devices of prevention of collective labour conflicts and the implementation of alternative soft ways of recourse compatible with the administrative and judiciary procedures in force can also foster a system of professional relations appropriate for reconciling economic competitiveness and social progress and establishing social peace.

Under certain conditions, social dialogue is a driving force of economic and social reforms. Its role is essential faced with the fundamental challenges for Morocco, such as the modernization of the labour organization, the promotion of social rights and the strengthening of competences and qualifications. The negotiations between the social partners are the best adapted way to progress in the field of modernization and management of change. Social dialogue must be recognized as an essential dimension of the model of society and development, through the search for a consensus of the actors on issues as important as labour law, reform of social protection, support for investment in education and qualifications and actions aimed at improving the dynamism of the economy. Morocco has implemented the CESE, an institution that should confer on the social partners the responsibility for fostering social dialogue in a new environment and under new conditions. This is expected to be both a key to better governance and a driving force of the economic and social reforms.

The Project of Institutionalization of Dialogue with Civil Society

With the aim of redefining its relation with civil society, the state, through the ministry responsible for the relations with the parliament and civil society, has recently launched (March 2014) a process of national dialogue with civil society to debate mechanisms and laws related to the new constitutional provisions (articles 12 to 15).

The Meaning of the Initiative

This enlarged consultation initiative with the associative actors aims at the global revision of the legal framework in order to strengthen the partnership between the state and civil society organizations while stressing the participatory approach adopted by the government in the implementation of the flagship reforms in several sectors.[23] The national dialogue on

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23. The initiative has not been unanimously welcomed. More than 400 civil society organizations (CSOs) have boycotted the dialogue arguing the lack of transparency in the constitution of the commission responsible for leading the operation.

society has enabled the strengths and weaknesses of this movement to be identified and the recommendations related to the implementation of the new prerogatives of civil society and associative life to be defined and, in the future, a real contractualization and partnership between the state and civil society based on a national charter of participatory democracy to be established. Three draft laws have been established:

- A draft code related to associative life with a view to strengthening its three fundamental pillars: freedom of association, the right of associations to equitable access to different types of public subsidies, consolidation of good governance and correlation between responsibility and accountability.
- A draft organic law on the rights of citizens to submit motions in legal initiatives, framed within participatory democracy, in order to implement the legal framework governing the exercise of the right to submit motions, in keeping with article 14 of the Constitution.
- A draft organic law on the right to submit petitions, framed within the participatory approach aimed at the adoption of a legal framework governing the right to submit petitions, in keeping with article 15 of the Constitution.

The recommendations on the implementation of new constitutional prerogatives of civil society and associative life therefore advocates the establishment, in the future, of a real contractualization and a partnership between the state and civil society based on a national charter of participatory democracy.

The Necessary Representation of the Great Causes
Some years ago, the struggle of social movements involved challenges focused on the labour world and material and quantitative demands. The challenges deriving from qualitative (i.e. socio-cultural) demands had little resonance. Today, the social movements go beyond the enterprise and are applied to very diverse fields of action, such as the status of women, urban demands, and so on. The evolution is significant as it tends to show that the change of society mainly involves mobilizations different from those focused on the labour world.

This initiative of dialogue with civil society expresses to a certain extent the necessary particular representation of 'great causes' led by the associations, such as poverty, local development, immigration, consumers and users as well as the specific representation of young people, women and senior citizens. The social dynamics of recent years enable us to take stock of the view of Moroccans on democracy in its different meanings – representative democracy, involving the mediation of parties and elected members; participatory democracy, by means of collective mobilizations (demonstrations, strikes, social movements). They enable us to see whether these different meanings are complementary or concurrent and analyse the underlying perceptions and socio-cultural and ideological factors.

The government has committed to implementing a policy aimed at improving the legal framework ruling the action of associations and non-governmental organizations. The national dialogue on the new civil society's constitutional prerogatives has enabled the views of the associative actors and civil society organizations working in this field to be collected. This initiative is the first national experience of widened consultation with the association actors aimed at globally revising the legal framework in order to strengthen the partnership between the state and civil society organizations while affirming the participatory approach adopted by the government in the implementation of the flagship reforms in diverse sectors.

CONCLUSION

Over the last 15 years, Moroccan economic growth has performed quite well although the domestic imbalances (public finances) and external imbalances (foreign trade) are still weak. The standard of living of the population has improved but social inequalities have widened. Morocco must face major challenges today. A framework in which we expect a great deal, not to say everything, from the state: control of balances, national solidarity or competitive upgrading of the productive fabric. Citizens are

becoming increasingly demanding and call for their needs to be quickly met.

The Moroccan economy and society have assets that make possible major improvements in dealing with the problems of social inclusion: growth margins to be exploited; public policies to be optimized; traditional solidarities to be reinvented; an active civil society or democracy seeking its way. These assets are considerable. So much so that we can predict that Morocco can solve its social problems. Several areas of reforms must be pursued or initiated to solve these problems. On the one hand, the consolidation of the competitiveness of the economy through the steady control of macroeconomic balances and efficiently embracing globalization through a solid network of enterprises and the development of infrastructures. On the other hand, a demand for distributive solidarity that resolves inequalities without incurring in increasingly heavy debts that would asphyxiate wealth creation.

Morocco has always experienced difficulties in consolidating its reforms given the lack of a receptive institutional sector. In certain aspects, the dynamic of the institutional reforms shows a will to enhance the potential of democratic emancipation. But, in reality, this dynamic has not been free from the tensions in society. Certainly, the model of political action is today more profoundly affected by the evolutions of the last decades. On the one hand, the segmentation of society fuels the multiplication of increasingly more heterogeneous social demands and a growth of the protest phenomenon. On the other, we are witnessing depreciation of the capacities of the political parties to manage the social demand and to respond to it by promoting appropriate political regulations. This hiatus should be corrected through a revalorization of political mediation and a reconstruction of the regulation capacities of democratic practices. The state finds it hard to abandon its bureaucratic control, to make the institutions work and to reorient behaviours: uncertainty, avoidance or bypassing strategies are even the norm. At a pinch, the reform appears as a process imposed rather than desired. On the other hand, the implementation of reforms stumbles against the unequal capacity or will of the actors to integrate them into their behaviour.

The new constitution opens prospects of establishing the rule of law in new norms and consolidating the fragile democratic achievements. It is paramount that economic and political actors assume the challenges of the reforms. The achievement of a reform no longer simply involve having a clear objective. Along with these conditions, there is the degree of support of the leading characters and society's capacity of absorption. The pressure for reforms will continue, even intensify. The problem does not lie in the choice between a strategy of shock or of small steps in the implementation of reforms but rather in strengthening the institutional frameworks in which the management of performance takes place. It is necessary to clarify the relation between state and society so that the link between autonomy and responsibility in public decisions is established.

> The new constitution opens prospects of establishing the rule of law in new norms and consolidating the fragile democratic achievements. It is paramount that economic and political actors assume the challenges of the reforms.

The first condition is that of re-establishing citizen trust in the political system through a profound clarification of the political responsibility of each actor in the system. The second would be to renew the support for the demand of democracy by these political institutions that are the parties – essential mediators between citizens and the world of political commitment. If the parties want to escape the crisis of trust that is hitting them hard, they must rediscover their roots in this demand for a domestic, living and participatory democracy increasingly in keeping with the elevation of the cultural level and the feeling of com-

petence of the militants. The third condition would be to clarify the lines of cleavage between the parties and the associative movement on the main issues of society. More particularly, the parties are invited to shake off the burdens of historical trajectories, to set out on a doctrinal renewal and to work in agreement with the associative network. This must also understand the limits of its role and become a vector of familiarization of citizens with the political universe, a space to lead them to take the floor on public challenges.

Thus, like a sick body produces antibodies, the hesitant democracy invites us to invent new political practices that will guide collective decision-making to real objectives, based on hope rather than myth. In all cases, reform of the method of approaching institutional problems must be implemented. The aim is to make a mode of operation of the economy and society prevail based on the optimal mobilization of resources, regulation that prevents abuses, transparent management and an assessment verifying respect for these commitments. What is at stake is a project of modernization that would transform the face of Morocco and respond to the demands of the 21st century.

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